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Abstract:
There is a general assumption that a more controlled or more focused attentional state 
is beneficial for most cognitive tasks. However, there has been a growing realization that 
creative problem solving tasks, such as the Remote Associates Task (RAT), may benefit 
from a less controlled solution approach. To test this hypothesis, in a 2x2 design, we ma-
nipulated whether solvers were given the RAT before or after an implicit learning task. 
We also varied whether they were told to “use their gut” as part of either initial task. The 
results suggest that a less analytic approach engendered by a “use your gut” instruction 
benefits performance on the RAT for monolingual solvers. The same benefit was not 
found for bilingual speakers suggesting that more controlled solution processes may be 
needed when speakers with multiple lexicons perform this task, which relies heavily on 
accessing common phrases in a particular language.
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Introduction
There is a general assumption that a more controlled or more focused attentional state is 
beneficial for most cognitive tasks. However, creative problem solving is one kind of task 
that may benefit from a less controlled approach (Wiley & Jarosz, 2012). Creative problem 
solving is distinctive in that successful solution generally requires a novel representation 
of the problem, or an original combination of diverse and remote associations in memory, 
which an overly analytic or focused approach may impede. If a solver is too focused during 
solution attempts, then they may only consider the most dominant or usual solution paths. 
Attempting to control solution progress via analytic or incremental approaches could also 
make the consideration of remote associations or novel solutions unlikely. Consistent 
with this hypothesis, studies have found that solvers with less working memory capacity, 
who possess less of an ability to control their own attention, can actually be more flexible 
creative problem solvers than participants with superior executive functioning (Ansburg 
& Hill, 2003; Beilock & DeCaro, 2007; Kim, Hasher, & Zacks, 2007). Similarly, creative prob-
lem solving performance seems to benefit when solvers are put in contexts that disrupt 
their ability to engage in more focused or controlled processing. For example, it has been 
suggested that positive affect broadens the scope of attention, which in turn improves 
creative problem solving (Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007; Subramaniam, Kounios, Parrish, 
& Jung-Beeman, 2008), and that working at a nonoptimal time of the day can improve 
performance on insight puzzles (Wieth & Zacks, 2011). Similarly, biofeedback intended 
to induce a passive mental state (by increasing alpha wave activity) has also been shown 
to improve creative performance (Haarmann, George, Smaliy, & Dien, 2012). Moreover, 
moderate intoxication from alcohol at once decreases working memory capacity while it 
also improves creative problem solving (Jarosz, Colflesh, & Wiley, 2012). Taken together, 
these various results converge toward the suggestion that less cognitive control or less 
focused attention may actually facilitate creative problem solving by engendering a less 
analytic approach to solution.
One example of a creative problem solving task that seems to benefit from a less-
controlled approach is the Remote Associates Task (RAT; Mednick, 1962). In this task, 
participants are given a set of three words (eight, skate, stick) and asked to find a fourth 
word that forms a compound phrase with the other three (figure). Success on this task 
is contingent upon the activation of weak semantic associations in memory (Bowden & 
Beeman, 2003; Mednick, 1962; Smith & Blankenship, 1991; Wiley, 1998). The goal of the 
present study was to test whether manipulating the nature of the solution approach 
adopted by individuals would alter performance on the RAT.
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Manipulating Solution Approach 
A main goal of the present study was to encourage a more passive, diffuse, or less analytic 
solution approach among solvers of the RAT. For most cognitive tasks, particularly those 
with an explicit goal or purpose, it is natural for people to attempt to control or focus 
their attention, as this generally aids intentional, systematic, or analytic processing (Engle, 
2002; Wiley & Jarosz, 2012). However, performance on implicit learning tasks is thought to 
benefit from more incidental and passive processing of information (DeCaro, Thomas, & 
Beilock, 2008; Knowlton, Ramus, & Squire, 1992; Reber, 1976; 1993). Thus, this study had 
solvers perform an implicit learning task before the RAT which was intended to engender 
a less controlled, less focused, and less analytic approach to problem solving, and as a 
result should improve performance on a creative problem solving task. 
One prominent paradigm for studying implicit learning is the artificial grammar task 
(Reber, 1976). This task has 3 critical features – 1) participants are incidentally exposed 
to grammatical letter strings under the guise of a short-term memory task, 2) they are 
then given a surprise test where they must identify strings conforming to that grammar, 
and 3) they are told to use their gut to make these decisions. Traditionally, results dem-
onstrate that participants who learn rules implicitly are able to identify new examples of 
grammatical strings at above chance levels, while participants who are directed to look 
for rules explicitly do not do as well (Reber, 1976).
It was predicted that performing an implicit learning task before the RAT should 
improve creative problem solving performance compared to not performing an implicit 
learning task before the RAT. There could be two possible explanations for such a result. 
The first is that engaging in implicit recognition of patterns may prime a less-controlled, 
intuitive solution approach versus an analytic or deliberative approach. However, an in-
triguing alternate possibility is that the simple “use your gut” instruction that is typically 
part of this paradigm may itself be sufficient to affect performance on the RAT. To test this, 
the presence of a “use your gut” instruction was also manipulated on the initial RAT task. 
Methods
Participants
One hundred and fifty-three monolingual English-speaking undergraduate students en-
rolled in Introduction to Psychology participated in this experiment for course credit as 
part of the subject pool at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Monolingual solvers were 
the target sample due to the consideration that performance on the RAT relies heavily 
on the ability to access common phrases in a specific language (English). In addition, 141 
early bilingual or non-native English speakers from the same pool were also run through 
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this study. Because these participants’ solution processes may differ fundamentally from 
those of monolinguals, the two groups were analyzed separately first and then compared.
Linguistic status was determined via self-report questionnaire. A first question asked 
participants to report if they were a native English speaker. A second question asked 
participants to report if they considered themselves to be monolingual or bilingual (or 
multilingual). Then participants were asked to list all languages that they spoke, in order 
of fluency, including English, at what age they began speaking them, and how fluent 
they were in each on a scale from 1 – 10 (1 meaning not fluent, 10 being very fluent). The 
monolingual native English sample was comprised of people who reported being mono-
lingual and spoke English as their native language. The early bilingual/non-native English 
speaker sample was comprised of people who reported being bilingual/multilingual from 
birth, or reported being non-native English speakers. Age of fluency did not differ among 
conditions in the bilingual sample, F < 1. While all bilinguals in the sample spoke English, 
other languages varied greatly. The most commonly reported other languages in our 
subject pool include Spanish, Indian and Chinese dialects, as well as other Asian, Arabic, 
and Eastern European language groups (Cushen & Wiley, 2011). Both linguistic groups 
were around 55% female and averaged 19 years of age.
Materials
Artificial Grammar
The artificial grammar task was primarily based on Reber (1976) and a more recent version 
of the task (Kinder, Shanks, Cock, & Tunney, 2003). Two versions of this task were created: 
one that included a “use your gut” instruction and one that omitted this phrase. 
In both versions of the task, a set of letter strings each consisting of three to eight 
letters was formed according to a finite state grammar shown in Table 1. The exact stimuli 
that were used are also included in Table 1. Participants were first run through a memory 
phase in which 15 strings were presented, then a test phase in which they determined 
whether a new set of strings followed the same underlying rules that governed the memory 
strings. At the start of the memory phase, participants were given the following instruc-
tions: This is a simple memory experiment. You will see items made up of the letters PSTVX. 
They will run from three to eight letters in length. Your job will be to try to reproduce each item 
correctly from memory. Each string was presented for three seconds (Kinder, et al., 2003). 
Next an answer blank appeared on the screen and participants needed to type back the 
string they had just seen. This was done for all 15 strings. After participants completed 
the memory phase, they were told: The items you just learned were formed according to a 
complex set of rules. You will now see some new items. 
In the “use your gut” version of the task, these instructions ended with the line: Just 
go with your “gut feeling” to decide whether each new item follows the same rules as the first 
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set of items. In the other version, these instructions ended with the line: Your task is to 
decide whether each new item follows the same rules as the first set of items. The test phase 
consisted of 22 grammatical and 22 nongrammatical strings in both versions, presented 
in the same randomized order for all participants. Responses were entered by pressing 
the ‘1’ key if the string followed the underlying rule set or ‘2’ if it did not.

Table 1 
Schematic Diagram of the finite-state grammar used to generate stimuli (Reber, 1976) 
and Stimuli used in Artificial Grammar Task 
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Remote Associates Task
For each RAT item, participants were given a set of three cue words simultaneously, and 
their task was to identify a fourth word that would form a common English phrase with 
each of the words as in Wiley (1998). To familiarize solvers with the task, participants were 
given an example problem and five practice problems. The completed example problem 
(washer, shopping, picture) demonstrated that the solution word could be either the first or 
second word in the common phrase (window washer, window shopping, picture window). 
Participants then completed five practice problems after which they received the correct 
solution words. After completing the five practice items, participants solved the 20 target 
RAT problems. Participants had 30 seconds to solve each problem and were instructed 
to press the spacebar once they had the answer. After pressing the spacebar or after 30 
seconds had elapsed, an answer blank appeared for 20 seconds in which participants 
needed to type in their response. Participants did not receive the correct solution words 
after the target problems.
A second version was also created for this task that added a “use your gut” instruc-
tion prior to the presentation of the practice problems. To create this new version, the 
following was added to the completed example problem: The best way to do this task is 
to go with your gut feeling. Participants were also prompted to enter responses based on 
their gut feelings before beginning the practice problems.
Design and Procedure
Participants were run in sessions of up to 16 individuals. There were four conditions that 
orthogonally varied whether or not the RAT was preceded by the Artificial Grammar Task 
and whether or not the initial task included a use-your-gut instruction. The use-your-gut 
instruction was always manipulated in relation to the initial task. In the first condition, 
participants completed the RAT first (without the “use your gut” instruction), followed by 
the artificial grammar task. In the second condition, participants completed the artificial 
grammar task first without the “use your gut” instruction, prior to the RAT. In the third 
condition, participants completed the RAT first with the “use your gut” instruction. In the 
fourth condition, participants completed the “use your gut” artificial grammar task first, 
prior to the RAT. Each session took approximately 30 minutes. 
Predictions
If performing an implicit learning task primes a less-analytic approach to problem solv-
ing, then both conditions with the artificial grammar task first should result in better RAT 
performance. If it is the “use your gut” instruction that is affecting solution approach, then 
both conditions with a “use your gut” instruction on the initial task should result in better 
RAT performance. 
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Results
The main dependent variable of interest is performance on the RAT, but for complete-
ness performance on the artificial grammar test was analyzed. No differences were found 
between monolingual or bilingual samples, nor across conditions, Fs <1.
Monolingual Solvers
Performance on the RAT for the monolingual solvers is presented in the top panel of Fig-
ure 1. A 2x2 (initial task instruction condition x task order) analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
identified a significant main effect for the “use your gut” instruction on the initial task, 
F(1,149) = 8.89, MSE = 8.82, p = .003, η2= .06. Participants who received the instruction on 
the initial task (regardless of whether the initial task was the artificial grammar task or the 
RAT) performed better on the RAT. There was no main effect for task order, nor was there 
an interaction (Fs < 1). There was no benefit from completing the artificial grammar task 
without the “use your gut” instruction before the RAT.
Planned comparisons using LSD showed that among participants who received the 
artificial grammar task first, those who received the “use your gut” instructions solved 
significantly more RAT problems than those who did not receive the instruction, p = .02. 
Additionally, among participants who received the RAT first, those who received the “use 
your gut” instruction also solved more RAT problems than those who did not receive the 
instruction, p = .05. 
Bilingual Solvers
Performance on the RAT for bilingual solvers is presented in the bottom panel of Figure 1. 
A 2x2 (initial task instruction condition x task order) ANOVA on just the bilingual sample 
indicated that bilingual solvers tended to do better when they were not encouraged to 
use their gut, F(1,137) = 3.41, MSE=9.88, p=.067, η2 = .02. Again, the main effect for task 
order was not significant nor was the interaction, Fs<1. 
Language Group Comparisons
A 2x2x2 (language group x initial task instruction condition x task order) ANOVA dem-
onstrated that bilinguals performed significantly less well than monolinguals F(1,286) = 
14.28, MSE=9.32, p <.001, η2 = .05. This analysis also revealed a significant language group 
x initial task instruction condition interaction, F(1,287) = 11.35, MSE=9.32, p <.001, η2 = .04. 
Follow-up tests using LSD showed that the “use your gut” instruction led to significantly 
greater performance among monolingual solvers, p <.001, while the two language groups 
did not differ in the no-gut conditions, p =.75. 
An additional analysis on the bilingual sample examined age of fluency in English to 
provide converging evidence that the poorer overall performance among bilinguals was 
due to their linguistic status, rather than other possible differences between the samples. 
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(This analysis is limited to the 126 bilingual participants who provided their age of fluency 
in English.) Performance on the RAT correlated significantly with age of fluency, r = -.31, p 
< .001. Participants who achieved fluency in English at early ages performed at a similar 
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Discussion
The results of the current study demonstrate that completion of an Artificial Grammar 
Task including the standard “use your gut” instruction before the RAT does enhance per-
formance on the RAT for monolingual solvers. Interestingly, this effect does not seem to 
be due to the implicit processing style prompted by the Artificial Grammar Task itself, but 
rather to the “use your gut” instruction. Removing the “use your gut” instruction from the 
Artificial Grammar Task negated its impact on the RAT. Additionally, including a “use your 
gut” instruction as part of the RAT was sufficient to improve performance on this creative 
problem solving task. These results suggest that the inclusion of the “use your gut” instruc-
tion is encouraging participants to use a less analytic approach when solving the RAT. 
Although benefits are seen whether solvers are exposed to this “use your gut” instruc-
tion as part of the RAT or as part of the Artificial Grammar Task, the reasons for improve-
ment may be slightly different in the two conditions. When given in the context of the 
RAT, this instruction may be directly shifting participants away from using an effortful, 
targeted search strategy toward a more passive, opportunistic approach. When given in 
the context of the Artificial Grammar Task, the influence of this instruction is necessarily 
less direct. Being instructed to use their gut during the Artificial Grammar Task seems to 
establish a default processing approach that may be carried over to the next task. 
The bilingual results are less clear, but the fact that a use-your-gut instruction made 
bilinguals worse than monolinguals could mean that a more analytic approach may be 
more helpful for this population. One possibility is that the bilingual speakers were less 
confident in their English skills and were less willing to “use their gut” for this task. An 
alternative possibility is that using your gut is a less useful instruction for bilingual solvers. 
It has been suggested that bilinguals must engage executive control to manage activa-
tion across their multiple lexicons (Bialystok, 2001; Costa, Hernandez, Costa-Faidella, & 
Sebastian-Galles, 2009). As such, bilinguals attempting a passive, opportunistic approach 
may have been more likely to activate non-English associates that could not possibly 
serve as solution words. The increased likelihood of activating these inappropriate and 
irrelevant associations may explain the lack of an advantage when bilinguals attempted 
to “use their gut” on the RAT. This explanation further suggests that those bilinguals who 
may have less experience in English, less knowledge of English phrases, or who may have 
a greater likelihood of passively activating non-English words than English phrases, should 
be at a particular disadvantage. Consistent with this prediction, a negative relationship 
was identified between the age of English acquisition and performance on the RAT.
Although Mednick first created the RAT to require broad activation and retrieval of 
distant associations, the present study adds to a number of other studies that have shown 
that RAT items may actually be solved either via more or less analytic approaches (see for 
example Cranford & Moss, 2012). It may certainly be the case that RAT problem solving can 
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be aided by attentional control under some circumstances. Several studies have shown 
that RAT problem solving ability is generally correlated with WMC (Kane, 2004; Ricks, 
Turley-Ames & Wiley, 2007), although this could be for many reasons including individual 
differences in verbal aptitude that also are generally correlated with WMC. Yet, effective 
inhibitory function may be especially important when a solver needs to deal with fixation 
induced by the presence of incorrect associates within the context of problem solving 
(Smith & Blankenship, 1991; Storm & Angello, 2011). In these cases attentional control 
may be critical for reaching solution.
Two novel contributions from the current study are the demonstration that a solver’s 
approach to problem solving can be manipulated by a relatively simple instruction that 
may facilitate a less focused or more passive search of memory. This novel result can be 
seen as consistent with demonstrations that reduced attentional control can be conducive 
to creative problem solving. A second contribution is the observation that performance 
on RAT items may fundamentally differ across monolingual and bilingual participants. As 
a result, where monolinguals’ access to remote associations may benefit from less analytic 
approaches to solution, bilinguals may need to invoke their executive functions in order 
to effectively perform this problem solving task.
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